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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 12-1147 
 ___________ 
 
IN RE: THOMAS W. OLICK, 
Debtor 
 
THOMAS W. OLICK, 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
JAMES KEARNEY; THOMAS JENKINS; 
              THE KNIGHTS OF COLUMBUS; AETNA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 2:10-cv-00458) 
 District Judge:  Honorable William H. Yohn 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 20, 2012 
 Before:  JORDAN, HARDIMAN and ALDISERT, Circuit 
 
Judges 
 (Opinion filed:  September 21, 2012) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Thomas Olick, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, seeks review of a series 
of decisions from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of 
 
2 
Pennsylvania.  We will affirm. 
I. 
 Although this appeal arises from a bankruptcy action, its roots extend to 2006, 
when appellant Olick filed a pro se complaint in Northampton County, Pennsylvania 
against the Knights of Columbus (“Knights”) and James Kearney (“Kearney”).  Olick, a 
former insurance salesman for the Knights, attacked both the circumstances surrounding 
his termination from their employ and the adverse benefits-related consequences of the 
termination, raising claims under a variety of legal theories.1  Olick later amended his 
state complaint, adding defendant Aetna, who successfully removed the matter to the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in April 2006, where 
it was eventually consolidated with another federal suit against the same defendants; 
Thomas Jenkins (“Jenkins”), the final party (who allegedly “replaced” Olick in his 
former capacity for the Knights), was added via amended complaint shortly thereafter.  
See E.D. Pa. Civ. Nos. 2:06-cv-01531, 2:07-cv-00121.  In a thorough opinion, the 
District Court granted some parts of the defendants’ motions to dismiss and denied other 
parts without prejudice to later renewal via motion for summary judgment.  See generally 
Olick v. Kearney
                                                 
1 Because the lower courts rendered a number of thorough decisions explaining the 
factual history of the case and identifying the relevant actors, we will not engage in an 
extended factual recitation and will assume the parties’ familiarity with the matter. 
, 451 F. Supp. 2d 665 (E.D. Pa. 2006).  Afterwards, Olick moved to 
dismiss the case without prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1), a request the 
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District Court granted on February 20, 2007. 
 This dismissal, however, did not bring matters to a close, for Olick had filed for 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection a few days earlier, see E.D. Pa. Bankr. No. 07-10880.  
In connection with the new bankruptcy action, Olick commenced two adversary 
proceedings, docketed as 07-00052 and 07-00060,2 that asserted substantially the same 
claims against the Knights, Kearney, Jenkins, and Aetna that he had raised earlier in his 
Northampton and District Court suits.  Recognizing that this duplication posed a problem, 
Bankruptcy Judge Frank decided to “adopt a particular case management philosophy,” 
treating the new actions as proceedings “designed to ‘complete’ the prior litigation . . . 
that was near disposition (by summary judgment and/or trial) at the time of Mr. Olick’s 
voluntary dismissal under Rule 41.”  Olick v. Kearney (In re Olick)
· Count 1: Age discrimination and retaliation against Aetna, the Knights, Kearney, 
and Jenkins, pursuant to the ADEA
, Adv. No. 07-060, 
2008 Bankr. LEXIS 3521, at *11–12 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 2008).  Judge Frank’s 
first order of business was to sift through Olick’s voluminous filings, structuring the 
allegations into ten recognizable counts.  The final list, to which all parties have referred 
throughout this litigation, was as follows: 
3
· Count 2: “Job discrimination” against the Knights and Kearney; 
 and its Pennsylvania and Connecticut state-
law equivalents; 
                                                 
2 These proceedings themselves were eventually consolidated.  All bankruptcy court 
docket references in this opinion refer to the numbering from 07-00060. 
 
3 Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified at 
29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.). 
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· Count 3: “Violations of ERISA4 and COBRA5
o Count 3A: Violation of COBRA sections 502(a)(1)(A) and 606(a)(4) 
against the Knights and Aetna; 
 Laws.”  Judge Frank subdivided 
this allegation into several subclaims: 
o Count 3B: Violation of ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B) against the Knights 
and Aetna; 
o Count 3C: Violation of ERISA section 502(a)(3)(B) against the Knights 
and Aetna; 
o Count 3D: Violation of ERISA sections 502(a)(2)(B) and 409(a) against the 
Knights and Aetna; 
· Count 4: Breach of contract against the Knights and Kearney; 
· Count 5: Tortious interference in business and contracts against the Knights, 
Kearney, and Jenkins; 
· Count 6: Breach of contract against Aetna; and 
· Count 7: Breach of contract and conversion against the Knights. 
In a June 2007 order, Judge Frank dismissed several of the claims.  See ECF No. 73.  
Count 1 against Aetna was dismissed, per Olick’s express consent; Count 3A was 
dismissed against Aetna; Count 3B was dismissed against the Knights; Count 3D was 
dismissed against all defendants; and Count 6 was dismissed against Aetna.  This had the 
effect of “narrow[ing] the claims . . . to those that had survived the motions to dismiss in 
the District Court case.”  Olick
 Several other counts would also be resolved before trial.  In a March 2008 oral 
opinion rendered from the bench, the Bankruptcy Court granted summary judgment in 
favor of the defendants on: the Count 1 discrimination claim (but not the retaliation 
, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 3521, at *10. 
                                                 
4 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.). 
 
5 Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 82 
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §(S) 1161 et seq.). 
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claim), the Count 2 job discrimination claim, the Count 3C equitable claim for premiums 
(but not the equitable claims regarding policy conversion against the Knights), the Count 
4 breach of contract claim, the Count 5 tortious interference claim, and the Count 7 
breach of contract and conversion claim.  See ECF No. 242 (order).  Pursuant to motions 
for reconsideration filed in the wake of that opinion, the Court also granted summary 
judgment in favor of Jenkins on the Count 1 retaliation claim, see ECF No. 246,6 and 
reaffirmed its decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Jenkins, Kearney, and the 
Knights on the Count 1 discrimination claim in an October 2008 opinion, see Olick v. 
Kearney (In re Olick), 398 B.R. 532 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2008).  Around this time, Aetna 
and Olick entered into a Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7068 offer of judgment, which resolved the 
remaining claims against Aetna.  See
 Before we discuss the final merits determination in Bankruptcy Court, two 
additional non-merits orders require a mention.  In October 2007, Olick was sanctioned 
in the amount of $1,000 for his attempt to relitigate claims against Aetna that had already 
been dismissed by the District Court.  
 ECF Nos. 256 (offer), 286 (order).  Left standing 
were the Count 1 ADEA retaliation claim against the Knights and Kearney, the Count 3A 
COBRA claim against the Knights, and the Count 3C equitable ERISA claim against the 
Knights. 
See
                                                 
6 Originally, the Court accidentally granted summary judgment in favor of Kearney, see 
ECF No. 242, but later corrected its order in the entry discussed above. 
 ECF No. 167.  And in August 2008, the 
Bankruptcy Court addressed a Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7054(b) costs dispute between Aetna and 
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Olick, finding that Olick was entitled to costs in the amount of $1,349.50 against Aetna.  
See generally Olick
The parties took the remaining three claims to trial in December 2008.  In a 
comprehensive opinion containing numerous findings of fact, the Bankruptcy Court 
entered judgment in favor of Olick and against the Knights on Counts 1 and 3A, for a 
combined judgment amount of $14,997.83.  The Court entered judgment in favor of 
Kearney on Count 1 and in favor of the Knights on Count 3C.  
, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 3521. 
See generally Olick v. 
Kearney (In re Olick)
Olick appealed in forma pauperis to the District Court, attacking the orders 
discussed above (with the exception of the initial June 2007 dismissal).  The District 
Court affirmed.  
, 422 B.R. 507 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2009). 
See generally Olick v. Kearney (In re Olick), 466 B.R. 680 (E.D. Pa. 
2011).  Significantly, Judge Yohn declined to reach any of the claims resolved from the 
bench in the March 2008 summary judgment opinion, as Olick had failed to provide 
transcripts of that decision, stymieing review.  See id. at 694–95 & n.15.  Although Olick 
did not timely appeal, he filed a motion in which he claimed to have never received the 
Court’s final order, along with a tardy notice of appeal.  The District Court granted relief 
pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(6), bringing the matter before us.  It has been fully 
briefed7
                                                 
7 Olick’s motion to file an oversized brief is granted. 
 and is ripe for disposition. 
 
The appellees argue that this appeal should be dismissed because of Olick’s failure to 
follow the applicable rules in preparing and submitting his brief.  They describe Olick’s 
 
7 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d) and 1291.  In re Phila. 
Newspapers, LLC, No. 11-3257, ___ F.3d ___, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 15419, at *10 (3d 
Cir. Pa. July 26, 2012).  We duplicate the standard of review employed by the District 
Court and evaluate the Bankruptcy Court’s orders “unfettered by the District Court’s 
determination.”  In re Orton, No. 11-4157, ___ F.3d ___, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 14898, 
at *4 (3d Cir. Pa. July 20, 2012); Lampe v. Lampe, 665 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir. 2011) (“In 
effect, we are reviewing the Bankruptcy Court’s disposition of this case.”).  We review 
grants of summary judgment arising out of bankruptcy adversary proceedings de novo.  
See Robeson Indus. Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. (In re Robeson Indus. 
Corp.)
                                                                                                                                                             
opening brief as “overlong, rambling, [and] largely indecipherable,” referencing its 
“Joycean, stream-of-consciousness” presentation.  Br. for Appellees 8–9.  They appear to 
maintain, too, that Olick should not be afforded any of the leeway normally given to pro 
se litigants because he “has filed over 150 lawsuits throughout the country” and “has . . . 
been a staunch critic of the judiciary during his tenure as a professional plaintiff.”  Br. for 
Appellees 2 & n.2. 
, 178 F.3d 160, 164 (3d Cir. 1999).  With regard to the claims resolved after trial, 
we apply a “clearly erroneous standard to the Bankruptcy Court’s findings of fact and a 
 
We will not accept the appellees’ invitation to dismiss this action.  First, in the pantheon 
of pro se filings, Olick’s submissions are not nearly as impenetrable as the appellees 
suggest—disorganized and strident, perhaps, but hardly “stream-of-consciousness” (nor, 
for that matter, do we detect any similarity to the works of Joyce).  Indeed, his materials 
before this Court are not an extraordinary departure from those filed below, which were 
sufficient to lead to partial judgment in his favor.  Second, Olick’s antagonism towards 
the judiciary and his status as a frequent plaintiff are of limited relevance.  Thus, we will 
reach the merits of this appeal, liberally construing Olick’s submissions as raising the 
same claims argued before the District Court. 
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plenary standard to its legal conclusions.”  Orton, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 14898, at *4 
(citations, quotations omitted); see also Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8013.  “A factual finding is 
clearly erroneous when the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite 
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”  Schlumberger Res. Mgmt. 
Servs. v. CellNet Data Sys. (In re CellNet Data Sys.), 327 F.3d 242, 244 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(citations, quotations omitted).  The decisions by the Bankruptcy Court to impose 
sanctions upon Olick and to allocate costs are reviewed for abuse of discretion.  See 
Waldron v. Adams & Reese, L.L.P. (In re Am. Int’l Refinery, Inc.), 676 F.3d 455, 461 
(5th Cir. 2012); In re Gioioso, 979 F.2d 956, 962 (3d Cir. 1992).  An abuse of discretion 
occurs when the Court rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion 
of law, or an improper application of law to fact.  Cross-Appellees in 09-1432 v. BEPCO, 
LP (In re 15375 Mem’l Corp.)
III. 
, 589 F.3d 605, 616 (3d Cir. 2009) (quotations, citations 
omitted). 
 We will begin our discussion with the Bankruptcy Court’s merits dispositions: its 
March 2008 summary judgment order, its October 2008 summary judgment reaffirmance, 
and its 2009 post-trial opinion.  However, we immediately encounter the same problem 
that the District Court faced, as Olick has failed to provide a transcript of the March 17, 
2008 proceedings (ECF Nos. 240–41) that led to the bench opinion granting partial 
summary judgment.  He has filed a motion to proceed pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 24(c), 
claiming that his indigence prevents him from obtaining copies of the relevant transcripts; 
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in his brief, he argues that the Bankruptcy Court had an “obligation to state in writing the 
basis of [its] findings,” and that a “destitute and/or bankrupt litigant should not be 
unreasonably prejudiced in a suit or appeal because he cannot afford to purchase 
transcripts of all pre-trial hearings.”  See
 Under Fed. R. App. P. 10(b) and 3d Cir. L.A.R. 11.1, the appellant, not the 
appellee, is responsible for transmitting the necessary elements of the record in support of 
the appeal.  As L.A.R. 11.1 makes plain, indigent appellants have the option of moving 
for transcripts to be provided at the Government’s expense pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 753(f).  Although summary judgment involves an independent examining and 
reevaluation of record evidence, 
 Br. for Appellant 13.  He argues further that the 
appellees were obligated to produce the missing portions of the record pursuant to Fed. R. 
App. P. 6(b)(2)(B)(ii). 
see Dubbs v. CIA, 866 F.2d 1114, 1118 (9th Cir. 1989), 
Olick does not point to any occasions where a Court of Appeals has excused Rule 10(b) 
compliance in a situation such as this.  Instead, noncompliance is generally answered by 
holding that the appellant has waived his claims on the relevant grounds.  See, e.g., 
Powell v. Estelle, 959 F.2d 22, 26 (5th Cir. 1992); Keller v. Prince George’s Cnty., 827 
F.2d 952, 954 n.1 (4th Cir. 1987).  Nor is it obvious that review would even be possible 
absent the transcript, see RK Co. v. See, 622 F.3d 846, 853 (7th Cir. 2010), because it is 
unclear whether any additional evidence or argumentation was submitted at the two 
hearings in question.  Because Olick has failed to secure a transcript despite having 
ample time to do so and despite the availability of § 753(f), we will follow the District 
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Court’s example and will deem objections to the March 2008 summary judgment order to 
be waived.8
 Because Olick does not appear to challenge the grant of summary judgment in 
favor of Jenkins, we move to the Bankruptcy Court’s opinion reaffirming its grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the Knights and Kearney on the Count 1 ADEA age 
discrimination claim.
  Olick’s Rule 24(c) motion is denied. 
9  The Court held, principally, that Olick failed to meet his burden 
under Step 3 of the test in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), 
which requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant’s proffered reason for an adverse 
employment action—in this case, poor employment performance—was pretext.  Id. at 
804; see also Smith v. City of Allentown, 589 F.3d 684, 690–91 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(reaffirming the applicability of McDonnell in the ADEA context after 
                                                 
8 We should note, however, that Olick misconstrues some of the proceedings below.  For 
example, he argues that in the original District Court suit (the one removed from state 
court), District Judge Katz concluded that the defendants were “not immune to a claim of 
tort[i]ous interference with business,” an un-appealed conclusion that therefore “became 
res judicata.”  Br. for Appellant 30; Olick, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 676–77.  He appears to 
suggest that this rendered the March 2008 summary judgment order per se invalid as to 
this and similar claims.  But Judge Katz’s observation was made in the context of a 
motion to dismiss.  By contrast, “a motion for summary judgment by definition entails an 
opportunity for a supplementation of the record, and accordingly a greater showing is 
demanded of the plaintiff.”  Wilderness Soc. v. Griles, 824 F.2d 4, 16 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
(emphasis added).  These two holdings are by no means at odds; that the defendants were 
not immune to suit does not imply the existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to 
their culpability.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
Gross v. FBL 
 
9 Olick points out that the Bankruptcy Court’s “Final Order is silent as to whether 
Kearney’s 2/1/05 reduction of Olick’s territory and its assignment to an inexperienced 
agent (Jenkins) was evidence of age discrimination.”  Br. for Appellant 26.  While he is 
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Financial Services, 557 U.S. 167 (2009)).  Having reviewed the record and examined 
Olick’s arguments on appeal, we conclude that summary judgment was appropriate.  
Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Olick, we are convinced, for 
substantially the same reasons discussed in the Bankruptcy Court’s opinion, that no 
“reasonable jury [would] find that appellees acted with discriminatory intent when they 
terminated” him.  Smith
 Next, we address the Bankruptcy Court’s post-trial decision, which resolved some 
claims in Olick’s favor and others in the defendants’ favor.  Olick argues that the 
Bankruptcy Court oversimplified the matter when it determined that, because Kearney 
functioned “only as Olick’s supervisor, not his employer,” an age discrimination 
retaliation claim could not lie against him.  
, 589 F.3d at 689, 692. 
Olick, 422 B.R. at 541; Br. for Appellant 15.  
Specifically, Olick points to 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 955(d), which prohibits any 
“person” from “discriminat[ing] in any manner against any individual because such 
individual has opposed any practice forbidden by this act,” where “practice” includes 
employment discrimination on the basis of age.  Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-60(a)(4) contains 
similar language, and also uses “person.”  Both state statutes define “person” quite 
broadly.  See
                                                                                                                                                             
correct, the Bankruptcy Court was “silent” because that claim was resolved before the 
Court issued its final order. 
 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 954(a); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-51(14).  By 
contrast, the ADEA’s retaliation subsection does not extend to activities perpetuated by 
“persons” who are not “employers,” “employment agencies,” or “labor organizations.”  
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29 U.S.C. § 623(d).  While the Bankruptcy Court observed that states generally construe 
their respective anti-discrimination statutes consistently with their federal counterparts, 
Olick, 422 B.R. at 542 n.45 (collecting cases), it arguably erred by failing to realize that 
Kearney, while immune under the federal statute, might not be so under its state 
equivalents.  To the extent that this was error, however, it was harmless.  The Bankruptcy 
Court specifically found that Lee was the Knights representative who made the decision 
to use November 1, 2005, as the “qualifying event” on Olick’s COBRA notice, id. at 528; 
because we agree with the Bankruptcy Court that no causal connection existed between 
Olick’s protected activity and the termination of his field-agent contract, see id. at 545–
46, the back-dating remains the sole actionable retaliation count, and it is clear that 
Kearney had no involvement in that activity.  Olick also argues that one of the 
Bankruptcy Court’s secondary factual findings—that Lee discovered the 2005 Notice of 
Intent to Terminate in Olick’s personnel file shortly after Olick filed his first suit against 
the Knights, see id.
 Finally, we turn to the sanctions and costs orders.  We see nothing amiss in the 
 at 524 n.15—is clearly erroneous, and he insists that all holdings 
“deriving from this false conclusion” are thus suspect and should be reversed.  Br. for 
Appellant 14.  Assuming arguendo that this finding was clearly erroneous, Olick has 
pointed to no holding or outcome rendered infirm by this mistake, which appears to have 
been of little overall relevance to his claims.  We have reviewed Olick’s COBRA and 
ERISA claims and find no reason to disturb the judgment of the Bankruptcy Court, which 
is affirmed for substantially the same reasons stated in its opinion. 
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imposition of sanctions based on a violation of res judicata, nor in the procedure utilized 
by the Bankruptcy Court pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9011.  See Prof’l Mgmt. Assocs. 
v. KPMG LLP, 345 F.3d 1030, 1033 (8th Cir. 2003) (per curiam); Estate of Blue v. Cnty. 
of L.A., 120 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 1997); cf. Sentinel Trust Co. v. Universal Bonding 
Ins. Co., 316 F.3d 213, 222–23 (3d Cir. 2003) (discussing preclusionary principles in the 
context of voluntary dismissals).  And with regard to costs, Olick mischaracterizes what 
the Bankruptcy Court was required to consider.  He argues that it improperly held that he 
was “barred” from recovering additional costs from Aetna because “he had refused a 
prior [o]ffer,” whose terms were not nearly as favorable, “in a different venue.”  Br. for 
Appellant 2.  However, under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7054(b), a Bankruptcy Court “may allow 
costs to the prevailing party” (emphasis added), granting the Court a great deal of 
discretion.  The Court determined that a 2006 offer of judgment sent by Aetna was 
substantially equivalent to a later, 2008 offer of judgment that Olick accepted.  While 
stressing that it was not suggesting that “every time a party rejects a Rule 68 Offer and 
achieves no better result, all costs arising after the rejection of the offer should be 
denied,” the Court nevertheless concluded that Olick had made no “showing nor provided 
any explanation why he doggedly pursued his claims against Aetna even though Aetna 
had already offered him, through the Rule 68 Offer, all of the relief he could reasonably 
have expected to obtain from Aetna.”  Olick, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 3521, at *46–47 
(emphasis added).  Even if the previous offer was less favorable to Olick, this resolution 
would have been well within the Bankruptcy Court’s discretion, but we are also in accord 
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with the District Court that—contrary to Olick’s assertions—the 2006 offer of judgment 
“did not contain any provision requiring that he pay premiums” or otherwise suggest bad 
faith.  Olick, 466 B.R. at 693–94.  As the record reveals, the Knights would have been 
responsible for premiums paid under the earlier offer of judgment.  See
IV. 
 Ex. 64, ECF No. 
118-4.  Finding no abuse of discretion, we will affirm for substantially the same reasons 
contained in the Bankruptcy Court’s opinion. 
 We have thoroughly examined the lengthy record in this case; and, in light of the 
often-conflicting testimony given by the Knights defendants and their paltry evidentiary 
proffer, we concur with the Bankruptcy Court that “the manner in which the Knights 
handled [Olick’s] termination was clumsy [and] perhaps even incompetent.”  Olick, 422 
B.R. at 545.  Some of Olick’s grievances were certainly legitimate, leading to his partial 
victory below.  But because Olick has identified no material infirmity in the Bankruptcy 
Court’s opinions and orders, we will affirm its judgment and the judgment of the District 
Court.10
                                                 
10 Olick’s motion for “timely service of pleadings” is denied as unnecessary.  We have 
full faith in the Clerk’s ability to timely forward our decision to Olick. 
 
